HTTP Security Headers: CSP, HSTS, Permissions Policy and a Complete Configuration

They are not a firewall and they do not repair broken authorization, vulnerable APIs, SQL injection, leaked credentials or outdated dependencies. Security headers are a defence-in-depth layer: they reduce the browser attack surface and restrict what can happen after another weakness has already been exploited.

In 2026, it is useful to separate three categories:

1. Baseline headers that make sense for most websites.
2. Architecture-dependent headers that may break OAuth, payments, CDNs, iframes or PDF delivery when copied without analysis.
3. Obsolete headers that should not be enabled simply to improve the score of an outdated scanner.

TL;DR: start with a carefully designed Content Security Policy, HSTS after HTTPS is fully deployed, X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, an explicit Referrer-Policy and a restrained Permissions-Policy. Use CSP frame-ancestors as the primary anti-framing control and retain X-Frame-Options only as a compatibility layer. Deploy COOP, COEP and CORP only after reviewing cross-origin integrations. Remove or disable X-XSS-Protection, Expect-CT, HPKP and the old Report-To header.

Recommendations and compatibility were last verified on 23 July 2026.

The main headers at a glance

Header	Typical recommendation	What it limits	Use everywhere?
Content-Security-Policy	application-specific policy, preferably nonce- or hash-based	XSS, injection, unapproved resource origins and framing	yes for HTML, after testing
Strict-Transport-Security	max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; add preload only after review	HTTP downgrade and bypassing certificate errors	yes when the whole domain is HTTPS-ready
X-Content-Type-Options	nosniff	MIME sniffing and some MIME confusion	yes
Referrer-Policy	strict-origin-when-cross-origin or stricter	URL path and query leakage	yes
Permissions-Policy	disable unused capabilities such as camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()	use of selected browser APIs by documents and frames	usually, after feature testing
CSP frame-ancestors	'none', 'self' or explicit origins	clickjacking and unwanted framing	yes for HTML documents
X-Frame-Options	DENY or SAMEORIGIN for compatibility	framing in older implementations	often, alongside frame-ancestors
Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy	often same-origin, unless popup relationships are needed	some XS-Leaks and window.opener access	architecture-dependent
Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy	require-corp or credentialless, only deliberately	embedding cross-origin resources without permission	no, not automatically
Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy	same-origin, same-site or cross-origin per resource	unwanted no-CORS cross-origin reads	resource-dependent
Cache-Control	no-store for highly sensitive responses; private for personalized content	storage in browser and intermediary caches	for sensitive responses
Set-Cookie	Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax/Strict as appropriate	theft and inappropriate cross-site sending of cookies	for session cookies
Reporting-Endpoints	endpoint for CSP/COOP/COEP reports	policy observability	optional
X-XSS-Protection	omit or set to 0	legacy XSS filter	do not enable
Expect-CT	remove	obsolete Certificate Transparency mechanism	no
Public-Key-Pins	do not use	historical certificate pinning	no

OWASP treats response headers as valuable hardening controls, while stressing that each value must match the response type and the application architecture.

A minimal starting point

This is a starting template, not a universal copy-and-paste answer:

Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; base-uri 'self'; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'; form-action 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; font-src 'self'; style-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; connect-src 'self'; upgrade-insecure-requests
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()
X-Frame-Options: DENY

This policy blocks inline scripts and styles, unlisted resource origins, framing, forms submitted to other origins, camera/microphone/geolocation access and HTTP navigation after HSTS has been stored.

If the site uses external fonts, analytics, maps, payment widgets, OAuth, tag managers, third-party APIs or inline code, the policy must be adapted.

1. Content-Security-Policy: the most powerful and difficult header

Content-Security-Policy defines where the browser may load scripts, styles, images, fonts, frames and network connections from. A correct CSP can substantially reduce the impact of XSS and data injection, but it does not replace input validation, output encoding and safe DOM APIs.

Core directives

Directive	Purpose	Common starting value
default-src	fallback for resource types without a dedicated directive	'self'
script-src	permitted scripts	nonce or hashes, optionally 'self'
style-src	permitted styles	'self', nonce or hashes
img-src	images	'self' data: https:
font-src	fonts	'self' and explicit CDN origins
connect-src	Fetch, XHR, WebSocket and EventSource	your API and explicit endpoints
frame-src	frames embedded by the page	only required origins
frame-ancestors	which parents may embed this page	'none' or 'self'
form-action	valid form destinations	'self' or explicit endpoints
base-uri	permitted <base> URLs	'self' or 'none'
object-src	<object> and <embed> plugins	'none'
upgrade-insecure-requests	rewrite HTTP subresources to HTTPS	no value

Allowlists versus a strict CSP

A domain allowlist can become fragile. A trusted CDN may host many unrelated files, and a third-party loader may pull in additional dependencies dynamically. web.dev recommends a strict CSP based on nonces or hashes; strict-dynamic allows scripts loaded by a trusted script to inherit trust.

Example nonce policy:

Content-Security-Policy:
  default-src 'self';
  base-uri 'self';
  object-src 'none';
  frame-ancestors 'none';
  form-action 'self';
  script-src 'nonce-{RANDOM_NONCE}' 'strict-dynamic';
  style-src 'self' 'nonce-{RANDOM_NONCE}';
  img-src 'self' data: https:;
  font-src 'self';
  connect-src 'self' https://api.example.com;
  upgrade-insecure-requests

Matching HTML:

<script nonce="{RANDOM_NONCE}">
  window.__APP_CONFIG__ = { apiUrl: "https://api.example.com" };
</script>

A nonce must be unpredictable, unique for every HTML response, present in the header and trusted elements, and generated by the server. A constant nonce stored in configuration does not provide the intended protection. For static pages that cannot generate a new value per request, hashes can be more practical.

Avoid unsafe-inline and unsafe-eval

'unsafe-inline' in script-src permits inline JavaScript and greatly weakens the XSS protection. 'unsafe-eval' enables APIs that execute strings as code, including eval() and the Function constructor.

Do not add them merely to silence console violations. Instead:

1. move inline code into external files;
2. use a nonce or hash;
3. identify the dependency requiring eval;
4. look for a different build or library configuration.

Trusted Types

A policy such as:

Content-Security-Policy: require-trusted-types-for 'script'; trusted-types app-policy

can require typed values at selected DOM XSS sinks such as innerHTML. Since February 2026, require-trusted-types-for is available in current major browsers, although older releases may not support it.

Trusted Types is an advanced defence. The application must define safe transformation policies, and frameworks and dependencies must be compatible. Adding the header alone is not sufficient.

Start with Report-Only

A safer rollout begins with:

Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; report-to csp-endpoint
Reporting-Endpoints: csp-endpoint="https://example.com/security/csp-reports"

Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only reports violations without blocking resources, allowing missing origins and broken flows to be identified before enforcement. Reporting-Endpoints replaces the deprecated Report-To header and should be preferred for current deployments.

A reporting endpoint should enforce payload size limits, rate limiting, safe logging, output encoding and a short, purpose-specific retention period. CSP reports can contain URLs and resource details.

2. Strict-Transport-Security: HTTPS with no downgrade path

HSTS tells the browser that a host must be contacted only over HTTPS. Once stored, the browser upgrades future HTTP attempts and prevents users from bypassing some certificate errors.

Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains

• max-age=31536000 stores the policy for one year.
• includeSubDomains covers subdomains.
• preload indicates an intention to join the browser preload list.

Do not start with preload

A wrong HSTS deployment can lock legitimate users out. An old HTTP-only subdomain, expired certificate or third-party service under your domain can make includeSubDomains and a long max-age dangerous.

A cautious rollout can use:

5 minutes → 1 day → 1 week → 1 month → 1 year

At each stage test the apex domain, active subdomains, wildcard and SAN certificates, legacy services, admin panels, APIs and partner endpoints.

HSTS preload requires a valid certificate, HTTP-to-HTTPS redirects, a sufficiently long max-age, includeSubDomains and the preload token. Removal may take weeks because the list is shipped inside browsers.

3. X-Content-Type-Options: stop MIME guessing

X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff

This tells the browser to respect the declared Content-Type rather than reinterpret a response as another type. Scripts and styles may be blocked when their MIME type does not match what is expected.

It does not replace correct server configuration. Responses still need accurate values:

Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Type: text/css; charset=utf-8
Content-Type: application/javascript; charset=utf-8
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Content-Type: image/avif

This is particularly important for user uploads, download endpoints, dynamically generated files, object storage, CDNs and error responses that might return HTML instead of JSON.

4. Referrer-Policy: reduce URL leakage

Referrer-Policy controls how much of the current page URL may be sent in the Referer header when requesting another resource.

A sensible default is:

Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin

It sends the full URL for same-origin requests, only the origin for cross-origin HTTPS requests, and no referrer on an HTTPS-to-HTTP downgrade.

Stricter alternatives include:

Referrer-Policy: no-referrer

or:

Referrer-Policy: same-origin

The choice may affect analytics, affiliate systems and payment providers. Secrets, tokens, email addresses and personal data should not be placed in URLs in the first place.

5. Clickjacking protection: frame-ancestors and X-Frame-Options

The most flexible control is CSP:

Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'none'

or:

Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self' https://portal.partner.example

frame-ancestors defines which parents may embed a document in <frame>, <iframe>, <object> or <embed>.

For compatibility, add:

X-Frame-Options: DENY

or:

X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN

MDN recommends frame-ancestors for modern deployments because it is more expressive. ALLOW-FROM is obsolete and may cause current browsers to ignore the header. X-Frame-Options must be an HTTP header; a <meta http-equiv> version has no effect.

6. Permissions-Policy: disable capabilities the site does not use

Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=()

The header controls access by a document and its frames to selected browser capabilities, including camera, microphone and geolocation.

Allow the current origin:

Permissions-Policy: geolocation=(self), camera=(), microphone=()

Or permit an explicit origin:

Permissions-Policy: geolocation=(self "https://maps.example")

Do not copy an enormous list of every known directive. Individual directives have different browser support and some remain experimental. Identify the capabilities the application uses, then explicitly disable relevant unused ones.

7. COOP, COEP and CORP: cross-origin isolation is not a universal default

These headers are related but solve different problems.

Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy

Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin

COOP controls whether documents opened through navigation or window.open() share a browsing context group. same-origin separates the document from cross-origin openers and mitigates some XS-Leaks.

It can break OAuth popups, payment windows and integrations relying on window.opener. In some cases this is more appropriate:

Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin-allow-popups

Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy

Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy: require-corp

COEP requires cross-origin no-cors resources to grant permission through CORP or to be fetched with CORS. Missing headers can block images, fonts, scripts, frames and other third-party assets.

An alternative is:

Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy: credentialless

This permits some no-cors resources without explicit CORP while stripping credentials such as cookies.

Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy

Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: same-origin

CORP is a policy on the resource itself and may use:

• same-origin,
• same-site,
• cross-origin.

It is not a replacement for CORS. MDN also documents a Chrome issue involving partial PDF rendering under some CORP deployments, so the header should not be applied globally without tests.

The pair:

Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin
Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy: require-corp

enables cross-origin isolation required by selected advanced APIs, including full SharedArrayBuffer access. Do not deploy it solely for a scanner score.

8. Secure cookies and caching

Set-Cookie and Cache-Control are not always listed as security headers, but they directly protect sessions and sensitive data.

Session cookie

Set-Cookie: __Host-session=RANDOM_VALUE; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax

• Secure restricts transmission to HTTPS.
• HttpOnly prevents JavaScript access.
• SameSite limits cross-site sending.
• __Host- requires Secure, Path=/ and no Domain, binding the cookie more tightly to the host.

SameSite=Strict is stronger but may disrupt returns from login or payment providers. SameSite=None requires Secure and should be used only for a genuinely cross-site cookie.

Sensitive responses

Cache-Control: no-store

This asks private and shared caches not to store the response. Personalized content that may be cached in the browser but not by intermediaries can use:

Cache-Control: private, no-cache

MDN recommends explicitly marking personalized responses private to avoid accidental shared caching.

9. Reduce technology disclosure

Headers such as:

Server: nginx/1.24.0
X-Powered-By: PHP/8.4
X-AspNet-Version: 4.0.30319

make fingerprinting easier. Removing them does not hide the stack from a determined attacker, but avoids direct version disclosure.

• remove X-Powered-By;
• disable framework version headers;
• limit detail in Server;
• do not publish a deliberately false version;
• do not mistake obscurity for patching.

OWASP recommends removing X-Powered-By and limiting Server, while noting that technologies can still be inferred in other ways.

10. Obsolete headers and misleading advice

X-XSS-Protection

Do not enable:

X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block

OWASP warns that legacy XSS filters can create vulnerabilities in otherwise safe pages. Omit the header or disable it explicitly:

X-XSS-Protection: 0

Use CSP, output encoding and safe APIs instead.

Expect-CT

Expect-CT is obsolete in practice because current clients require Certificate Transparency for modern certificates. MDN describes it as largely obsolete since June 2021.

Public-Key-Pins

HPKP should not be deployed. A wrong pin could lock users out for a long time and the header has been removed from modern browsers. Prefer correct TLS, automated renewal, CAA, certificate monitoring and carefully reviewed HSTS preload.

Report-To

The old:

Report-To: { ... }

is deprecated. Use:

Reporting-Endpoints: csp="https://example.com/reports/csp"

Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *

CORS is not a hardening header bundle to add globally. Access-Control-Allow-Origin relaxes the Same-Origin Policy. Credentialed API responses cannot safely combine wildcard * with authenticated cross-origin access. Allow only required origins and validate them server-side.

11. Server configuration examples

Nginx

add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; base-uri 'self'; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'; form-action 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; connect-src 'self'; upgrade-insecure-requests" always;
add_header Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains" always;
add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;
add_header Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin" always;
add_header Permissions-Policy "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()" always;
add_header X-Frame-Options "DENY" always;

always matters because it keeps the headers on error and non-standard status responses.

Apache

<IfModule mod_headers.c>
  Header always set Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; base-uri 'self'; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'; form-action 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; connect-src 'self'; upgrade-insecure-requests"
  Header always set Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"
  Header always set X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"
  Header always set Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
  Header always set Permissions-Policy "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()"
  Header always set X-Frame-Options "DENY"
</IfModule>

PHP

<?php

header("Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; base-uri 'self'; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'; form-action 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; connect-src 'self'; upgrade-insecure-requests");
header("Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains");
header("X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff");
header("Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin");
header("Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()");
header("X-Frame-Options: DENY");

Headers must be sent before the response body. Generate a cryptographically random nonce separately for every request.

Node.js / Express

app.use((req, res, next) => {
  res.setHeader(
    "Content-Security-Policy",
    "default-src 'self'; base-uri 'self'; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'; form-action 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; connect-src 'self'; upgrade-insecure-requests"
  );
  res.setHeader(
    "Strict-Transport-Security",
    "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"
  );
  res.setHeader("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff");
  res.setHeader("Referrer-Policy", "strict-origin-when-cross-origin");
  res.setHeader(
    "Permissions-Policy",
    "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()"
  );
  res.setHeader("X-Frame-Options", "DENY");
  res.removeHeader("X-Powered-By");
  next();
});

A site using CDNs, WebSockets, OAuth, payments or maps will need a broader but still explicit CSP.

12. A rollout process that avoids outages

Inventory

List all script, style, font and image origins; API and WebSocket endpoints; iframes; OAuth/payment popups; CDN resources; user uploads; HSTS subdomains and browser capabilities used by the application.

Observe

• run CSP in Report-Only;
• collect reports and browser console violations;
• test every critical user path;
• include mobile and supported browsers;
• inspect error pages, redirects and static assets.

Enforce gradually

• begin with object-src, base-uri, frame-ancestors and form-action;
• move to static resources;
• enforce strict script-src last;
• increase HSTS max-age gradually;
• test COOP/COEP separately against popup and cross-origin integrations.

Monitor regressions

CI tests should fetch representative URLs, detect duplicate or conflicting headers, confirm MIME types, detect accidental removal of CSP/HSTS and run end-to-end login and payment flows.

13. How to test headers

Check the response directly:

curl -I https://example.com/

Follow redirects:

curl -IL https://example.com/

Inspect a specific resource:

curl -I https://example.com/assets/app.js

Verify headers on the homepage, login, 404 and 500 responses; confirm that CSP is not duplicated with conflicting policies; make sure HSTS is sent only over HTTPS; check MIME types; and verify that a CDN or reverse proxy has not stripped the headers.

The free POLPROG Security Headers Inspector checks HSTS, CSP, framing protection and other controls. Use the DNS & SSL Inspector for certificate and DNS checks, and Website Health Check for a broader SEO, performance, accessibility and security review.

Deployment checklist

CSP

• Restrictive default-src.
• object-src 'none'.
• Limited base-uri.
• frame-ancestors matches the real embedding model.
• form-action restricts form destinations.
• Inline code uses a nonce or hash when required.
• The nonce is unique per response.
• No unjustified 'unsafe-inline'.
• No unjustified 'unsafe-eval'.
• Policy tested in Report-Only first.
• Report endpoint has rate limits and limited retention.

HTTPS and HSTS

• Every page and resource works over HTTPS.
• HTTP redirects directly to HTTPS.
• Certificates are monitored.
• All subdomains are inventoried.
• max-age increased in stages.
• includeSubDomains is safe.
• preload added only after reviewing consequences.

Other controls

• X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
• Correct Content-Type on every response.
• Explicit Referrer-Policy.
• Permissions-Policy disables unused capabilities.
• No ALLOW-FROM in X-Frame-Options.
• COOP does not break OAuth or payments.
• COEP does not block required third-party assets.
• CORP matches each resource’s sharing model.
• Session cookies use Secure, HttpOnly and appropriate SameSite.
• Sensitive responses use correct Cache-Control.
• Technology version headers are removed.
• X-XSS-Protection is absent or disabled.
• Expect-CT, HPKP and old Report-To are removed.

Verdict

For most business websites and web applications, the right order is:

1. Correct HTTPS, MIME types and secure cookies.
2. An application-specific CSP rolled out through Report-Only.
3. HSTS deployed in stages.
4. nosniff, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy and framing protection.
5. COOP, COEP and CORP only when the cross-origin model is understood.
6. Removal of obsolete and information-leaking headers.

The best security-header set is not the longest one. It is the smallest policy that accurately matches the application, survives critical-path testing and remains monitored after every deployment.